
TMI: A Legacy of Lies Penn State Harrisburg, PA March 27, 2019



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Arnie and Maggie Gundersen

www.fairewinds.org


1979: Speaking About Three Mile Island



Three Mile Island Meltdown



Governor Thornburgh



AG: Governor, you were lied to on March 28, 1979

Thornburgh: "Yes, I was lied to."



Peter Bradford

Former NRC Commissioner during TMI

"I believe Thornburg would have ordered an evacuation if we had told him to. But we didn't have accurate information either."

"I never had the sense that Met Ed had the capability to devise a corporate conspiracy in real time. I'm less certain as to whether individuals deliberately understated at least the uncertainties of the situation, if not the specifics... I remember thinking that Henry (Meyers) made a pretty convincing case as to a couple of individuals..."



Dr. Henry Meyers, Science Advisor to **Senator Mo Udall**

97th Congress 1st Session

COMMITTEE PRINT NO. 3

REPORTING OF INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND

A REPORT

PREPARED BY

THE MAJORITY STAFF

COMMITTEE ON

INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS

OF THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION



MARCH 1981

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WASHINGTON: 1981

Gundersen Expert Report on TMI

EXPERT WITNESS REPORT

THREE MILE ISLAND LITIGATION

FOR HEPFORD, SWARTZ, AND MORGAN - REPRESENTING PLAINTIFFS

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EXPERT WITNESS REPORT by Arnold Gundersen THREE MILE ISLAND LITIGATION FOR HEPFORD, SWARTZ AND MORGAN - REPRESENTING PLAINTIFFS Page 1 of 14

FINDING 1 - Minimizing Exposure to the Public

Prior to the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Power Station, the Defendant clearly understood its legal responsibility for operating a safe nuclear power plant and for protecting the health and safety of the general public, in the event of a nuclear accident.

- · The Defendant specifically said, "A high degree of protection against the occurrence of postulated accidents... is provided through correct... operation..."1
- · Additionally, the Defendant acknowledges its responsibility for "Protection of the health and safety of the Public" and to make "... every reasonable effort to minimize exposure... even in emergencies."2

FINDING 2 - Providing Information to the State of Pennsylvania

Prior to the accident, the Defendant understood its legal responsibility for prompt and accurate information and notification to limit exposure to the general public. Specifically,

- · The Defendant acknowledged it was "... responsible for prompt notification of appropriate Pennsylvania State Authorities if an accident is causing or is threatening to cause significant off-site exposure."3
- · The Defendant also acknowledged that "... early information [is] needed to decide what action must be taken to limit radiation exposure to the general public in the event of a site or general emergency."4

FINDING 3 — Accident Damage Indications

805-885-9933

During the first several hours (i.e. by no later than 10 a.m.) following the accident, the Defendant had accurate information from multiple, independent sources which indicated severe core damage, release of lethal concentrations of radioactive material into the containment, and hydrogen generation from a zircromium-water reaction. Specifically:



Before 7am

- 1. Engineer and supervisor using approved emergency procedure calculate exposure in Goldsboro at 10R/hr.
- 2. By this emergency procedure, an evacuation was required.
- 3. At 7:30 TMI called the State and told them 10R/hour seemed too conservative.

Before 7am

- **4.** TMI did not tell the State that employees already received significant radiation exposure.
- **5.** TMI did not tell the State that almost every radiation monitor was already off scale.
- **6.** The State was informed that a helicopter flew to Goldsboro at 7:30am and found no radiation. In fact, a helicopter never arrived on-site until 8:30am.

Before 10am

- 1. Core thermal couples indicate temperatures in excess of 2100 F.
- 2. Hot leg thermal couples indicated super heated steam or hot gases in excess of 700 F.
- 3. Reactor coolant pump amperage indicates steam, not water, being pumped.
- 4. Neutron detectors outside vessel indicate excess neutrons.

Before 10am

5. Reactor building dome radiation monitors indicate lethal radiation...

- **6.** Reactor coolant samples indicate extensive fuel failures (200R/hr).
- 7. Health Physics informs management to evacuate Auxiliary Building.

Before 2pm

- 1. Based on core temperature, it's clear that Hydrogen is being generated by 10am.
- 2. 12:20 NRC asks 'what is core temperature?'
- **3.** TMI responds 'computer is printing question marks', 'that means the computer is messed up'. In fact, the computer was working and the question marks indicated that the temperature had exceeded 700 F.

Before 2pm

- **4.** Hydrogen Explosion. TMI informed NRC two days later.
- **5.** Plant manager in control room, when detonation occurred, four operator affidavits confirmed his awareness of the explosion.
- 6. Control room shook.

Quotes from Plant Manager Miller.

referring to in-core temperature.

"They were hot enough that they scared you."

"Pretty early we were scared... radiation was all over the place. Everything was off scale".

-in phone call to corporate requesting a General Emergency.


"We don't know where the hell the plant was going"

"We were not, in our minds, convinced the core was totally covered."

The TMI Class Action Trial

Defendant attorney Chub Wilcox, while deposing me for the TMI trial, asked me, "You mean that in the midst of all this confusion, you expected us to tell the governor?"

I replied and said, "That's exactly my point, your client was confused and did not convey that to the Governor."



Early on in the accident, the NRC estimated that 10,000,000 Curies of radiation were released.

This value for radiation release is still quoted on the NRC's website today

One Curie is 37,000,000,000 (37 Billion) disintegrations per second.

Because all on-site radiation monitors were off scale, it was impossible to measure the radiation released from TMI.

All analysis of radiation releases are based upon estimates are based upon off-site dose readings to which mathematical corrections were applied.

Here's what the NRC's John Collins had to say about off-site measuring of dose.

"My problem... the concern I have about aerial monitoring was that for the first three days we were pretty much into a very static air condition. There was very little dispersion. When you were flying your helicopter and taking your aerial measurements, you were actually reading erroneous readings... I really doubt some of the measurements that were made."

Here's what the NRC's John Collins had to say about off-site measuring of dose.

"...not only should we have good monitors but also people who understand how to use them. That was a problem here since day one. They get data and nobody sits down and evaluates the data to try and understand what it means."

"Going out in an automobile and chasing a plume with a meter is a very difficult job. You never know the width of the plume, you never know whether you are in the center or on the edge of it. At best, it gives you a rough idea."

The NRC estimate is based on a report by NRC manager, Mr. Lake Barrett. NUREG-0637, Appendix C.

Barrett uses time averaged plume dispersion (Chi/Q).

Barrett assumes the center (highest concentration) of the plume hits the detector.

Barrett then averages many days of releases.



<u>Barrett</u>	Table #	<u>Dates</u>	Maximum Curies
	2	3/28 – 3/29	14,000,000
	3	3/29 - 3/31	5,600,000
	4	3/31 - 4/1	9,800,000
	5	4/1 - 4/2	1,100,000
	6	4/2 - 4/3	4,300,000
	7	4/3 - 4/4	162,000
	8	4/4 - 4/5	1,100,000
TOTAL			36,062,000

During the TMI class action trial, nuclear industry witness John Daniel tried to prove that 10,000,000 Curies were released. He attempted to calculate this release differently than the NRC by estimating what radiation was in the core and in the containment.


Gundersen analyzed Daniel's report and showed that using Daniel's assumptions, the actual release was at least 150,000,000 Curies.

Daniel then refuted his initial report and changed his assumptions to show that 17,000,000 Curies were released.


The nuclear industry's own witness estimated more radiation was released at TMI than the NRC estimated.


Three Mile Island: Dr. Steve Wing






SOURCE: ENVINORMENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES, VOL. 5, NO. 1, JAN. 1997. GRAPHIC BT JULIA R. BRTAIN, ENDEAVORS, FALL 1997, ARD JP | HOSTLE






Radiation doses resulting from the 1979 nuclear accident


SOURCE: ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES, VOL. 5, NO. 1, JAN. 1997. GRAPHIC BY JULIA R. BRYAN, ENDEAVORS, FALL 1997, AND JP TROSTLE






Radiation doses resulting from the 1979 nuclear accident


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




Radiation doses resulting from the 1979 nuclear accident

SOURCE: ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES, VOL. 5, NO. 1, IAN. 1997. GRAPHIC BY JULIA R. BRYAN, ENDEAVORS, FALL 1997, AND JP TROSTLE





Radiation doses resulting from the 1979 nuclear accident

SOURCE: ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES, VOL. 5, NO. 1, IAN. 1997. GRAPHIC BY JULIA R. BRYAN, ENDEAVORS, FALL 1997, AND JP TROSTLE


Recently released records from Hershey Chocolate, as quoted by Dr. Hellen Caldicott, in her book, "Nuclear Power is Not the Answer", shows that Iodine-131 was measured in milk as far as 150 miles away from TMI in the several days immediately after the disaster. This proves that the NRC's assumed radiation releases are wrong.



The pressure spike is for the whole containment; sub-compartments are higher.

Before detonation, pressure is 3 pounds higher then outside air pressure.

After detonation, pressure remains at or near outside air pressure, which means the last remaining barrier containing the radiation was breached.



Expert report of Dr. Sinovy V. Reytblatt at TMI Class Action Trial (12/17/2005), p19

"A plausible release of up to 8 to 10% of the volatiles may have occurred due to the unavailability of the containment system at the time of the accident."

Industry witness John Daniel reported that immediately after the detonation:

Radiation monitor HP-R-234 recorded a five-fold increase in radiation.

Radiation monitor HP-R-3240 recorded a ten-fold increase, and then went off scale.

Radiation monitor MU-R-720H doubled in detected radiation. This monitor was protected by 4 inches of lead, meaning that it only measured powerful gamma rays and not any beta or alpha isotopes.

Time averaged plume dispersion can be wrong on the low side by a factor of 10.

Center line Chi/Q can be wrong on the low side by a factor of a 1000.

Averaging the data is wrong on the low side by a factor of 3.4.

THE NET EFFECT IS THAT THE NRC'S 10,000,000 CURIES IS DEFINATELY LOW. THE ACTUAL RELEASES COULD BE 10 TIMES HIGHER THAN THE NRC'S ESTIMATE.



How much Radiation Was Released?

Organization	Release (Curies)
Industry Witness John Daniel	150 Million Initial
NRC Lake Barret	34 Million
Industry Witness John Daniel	17 Million Revised
NRC Website	10 Million



In an Email to Fairewinds, a Former High School Student at Middletown HS Shared Her Account of the Morning of the Accident

"Our chemistry teacher had taught the whole semester on nuclear power and waste storage, and so he had run a Geiger counter out side the window for the entire semester. The morning of the accident, my chem class started at around 10am. As we entered the classroom the Geiger counter went haywire from the normal clicking to a solid buzz sound. He immediately picked up the phone and called Governor Thornburg's office and reported the readings. The response was "We know, and don't do anything." By 11 am, parents were coming to the school and pulling out their children. Of course, many people in town worked at the plant or had relatives who did, and they did not wait for a formal evacuation call."

Conclusions

- Evacuation should have been ordered by 10 am
- The containment failed after the hydrogen detonation
- 3. Radiation releases were at least 100 million curries, 10x higher than the NRC estimate


TMI + Minimize = TMInimize

TMInimize (Verb): The actions of regulators and the nuclear industry claiming Minimal health impacts to citizens from radioactive releases after a nuclear meltdown

Later Nuclear Disasters Used the Same Playbook- TMInimize!







Manual for Survival, Kate Brown

Her heroes are not first responders but brave citizen-scientists, independent-minded doctors and health officials, journalists, and activists who fought doggedly to uncover the truth about the long-term damage caused by Chernobyl. Her villains include not only the lying, negligent Soviet authorities, but also the Western governments and international agencies that, in her account, have worked for decades to downplay or actually conceal the human and ecological cost of nuclear war, nuclear tests, and nuclear accidents. Rather than attributing Chernobyl to authoritarianism, she points to similarities in the willingness of Soviets and capitalists to sacrifice the health of workers, the public, and the environment to production goals and geopolitical rivalries.

-The Chernobyl Syndrome, NYBooks.com

The Cover Up



"The information I received was neither timely nor accurate" - Naoto Kan, former Prime Minister of Japan



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